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ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND OFFSHORING ON AMERICAN
WORKERS USING THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEYS
Avraham Ebenstein, Ann Harrison, Margaret McMillan, and Shannon Phillips*
Abstract—We link industry-level data on trade and offshoring with indivi-
dual-level worker data from the Current Population Surveys from 1984 to
2002. We find that occupational exposure to globalization is associated
with significant wage effects, while industry exposure has no significant
impact. We present evidence that globalization has put downward pres-
sure on worker wages through the reallocation of workers away from
higher-wage manufacturing jobs into other sectors and other occupations.
Using a panel of workers, we find that occupation switching due to trade
led to real wage losses of 12 to 17 percentage points.
I. Introduction
BETWEEN 1983 and 2002, the U.S. economy experi-enced a boom in offshoring and a doubling of imports
of manufactured goods from low-income countries. Over
this same period, roughly 6 million jobs were lost in manu-
facturing, and income inequality increased sharply. These
parallel developments led some critics of globalization to
conclude that ‘‘good’’ manufacturing jobs had been shipped
overseas, putting downward pressure on wages of middle-
class American workers. Concern over these developments
motivated the U.S. Congress to pass the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004. Yet the degree to which changes in
the U.S. labor market are related to growth in international
trade and offshoring is still the subject of heated debate.
The standard approach to identifying effects of import
competition on wages is to use variation in the prices (or
quantities) of imported goods across industries over time as
an exogenous shock and examine the impact on industry-
specific labor market outcomes. This approach has been
used to measure the impact of globalization on industry
wage differentials and the effects of sector-specific import
competition on wages and employment. For example, Feen-
stra and Hanson (1999) use a two-step procedure, first iden-
tifying the impact of outsourcing and high-technology
investments on productivity and prices and then tracing
through the impact of induced productivity and price
changes on relative wages among production and nonpro-
duction workers. Using data for the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tor between 1979 and 1990, they find that the real wages of
production workers were probably unaffected by offshoring
activities, while the real wages of nonproduction workers
increased by 1 to 2 percentage points. Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (2006), in the first paper to distinguish between
imports from high-income versus low-income countries,
find that only low-income imports negatively affected firm
exit, survival, and employment growth.
A key limitation of the previous literature on the labor
market effects of globalization is that it typically focuses on
changes within manufacturing. In this paper, we focus on
potential wage impacts across occupations, both within
manufacturing and across the broader economy. In a typical
occupation, some workers are in tradable sectors (e.g., man-
ufacturing), and others are in nontradable sectors (e.g., fast
food services). To expand our analysis of wage outcomes
due to globalization beyond manufacturing, we begin by
defining the concept of occupational exposure to interna-
tional trade or offshoring activities.1 Inasmuch as the de-
mand for a particular worker’s skill is affected by trade,
those who are working in either the tradable or nontradable
goods (or services) sector could be hurt by foreign competi-
tion. Also, if occupational tenure and experience is a more
important determinant of wages than industry experience,
then focusing on exposure at the industry level may under-
state the costs of globalization.
In order to examine this empirically, we link industry-
level data on trade and offshoring with individual-level
worker data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS).
We find a significant divergence between the impact of
occupational exposure and industry exposure to globaliza-
tion on wage outcomes. In particular, we find no significant
negative effects of either international trade or offshoring
on wages of all types of workers if we measure globaliza-
tion at the industry level. When we focus on occupational
exposure and include workers in both manufacturing and
services, however, we find large and significant effects. Our
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analysis indicates that workers in routine occupations, such
as those employed in blue-collar production occupations,
have suffered the greatest losses from globalization. These
results are consistent with recent empirical work demon-
strating the importance of occupational tenure and down-
playing the importance of tenure within a particular indus-
try for a worker’s wages (Kambourov & Manovskii, 2009a,
2009b).2
We also explore how the impact of globalization has
changed over time. A number of scholars have suggested
that wage pressure from developing countries is likely to
have increased during the 1990s. Feenstra (2008) singles out
expanded competition from China as having exerted pres-
sure on U.S. wages, and he is not alone in this view (see also
Freeman, 1995, and Krugman, 2008). Empirical evidence
for this conjecture is limited, however.3 We find that while
the impact of trade and offshoring on U.S. wages through
the mid-1990s was small in magnitude and insignificant, the
effects became much larger in the second half of the 1990s.
By the end of our sample period in 2002, we find significant
and economically important effects of globalization on
wages using our occupational exposure measure. Based on
our study, it is likely that the impact of globalization on U.S.
wages in since 2002 has increased further as more firms
have engaged in offshoring to low-wage destinations.4
We examine the impact of globalization on U.S. workers
by focusing attention on how they are affected by imports,
exports, and offshoring to low- and high-income countries.
Our results indicate that a 10% increase in occupational
exposure to import competition is associated with nearly a
3.0% decline in real wages for workers who perform routine
tasks among workers in our 1984 to 2002 sample and a 4.4%
decline for workers taken from 1997 to 2002.5 We also find
substantial wage effects of offshoring to low-wage countries:
a 10 percentage point increase in occupation-specific expo-
sure to overseas employment in low-wage countries is asso-
ciated with a 0.7% decline in real wages for workers per-
forming routine tasks for our entire sample and a 2.0%
decline for 1997 to 2002. For routine occupations with sig-
nificant export activity, wages are positively linked to export
growth. For these workers, a 10 percentage point increase in
export share at the occupation level is associated with a 6.7
percentage point increase in wages over the sample period.
For the end of the period (1997–2002), every percentage
point increase in export shares for routine workers is asso-
ciated with a percentage point increase in wages.
We also find that globalization has put downward pres-
sure on worker wages through the reallocation of workers
away from higher-paid manufacturing sectors toward other
sectors and a shift of workers out of trade-vulnerable occu-
pations. First, we find that domestic employment has de-
clined in industries with expansion in low-income-country
employment, consistent with evidence that multinational
firms have shifted production overseas.6 Then, using a sub-
set of the CPS data where we are able to match the same
worker over time, we estimate a first-stage equation with the
exposure of an occupation to trade as an instrument for
whether a worker switched occupations. In the second stage,
we find that occupation switching due to trade led to real
wage losses of 12 to 17 percentage points between 1984 and
2002.7 Any analysis of the wage effects of globalization that
is restricted to manufacturing workers would miss the down-
ward pressure on wages resulting from workers leaving
manufacturing and entering the service sector. The asso-
ciated distributional implications are potentially important,
given historically large wage premiums paid to manufactur-
ing (relative to service) workers in the United States (see fig-
ure 1 for a graphical exposition) and significant empirical
evidence that industries compensate workers differently.8 It
is also worth noting that our results are unlikely to be
explained by the fact that weaker workers are more likely to
switch occupations (Trefler & Lui, 2011). When we control
for unobserved differences in worker quality among those
who switch occupations, we continue to find suggestive
results that the wage declines associated with globalization
are due to worker’s switching occupations.
An important limitation of our study (and other papers in
this literature) is that we are unable to fully separate the
2 Kambourov and Manovskii (2009a) find that ‘‘returns to occupational
tenure are substantial.’’ They also indicate that ‘‘when occupational
experience is taken into account, tenure with an industry or employer has
relatively little importance in accounting for the wage one receives. This
finding is consistent with human capital being occupation specific.’’ Their
results imply that switching occupations will have a much greater impact
on worker wages than switching industries.
3 One important exception is Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2012), who
exploit differences in U.S. regional exposure to import competition from
China to show significant effects on employment, unemployment, and
wages from 1990 to 2007.
4 Since the CPS changed its occupational coding scheme in 2003, we do
not attempt analysis beyond 2002 in this paper. Our analysis of Bureau of
Economic Analysis data indicates that offshoring to low-wage countries
has increased markedly since 2002, with employment in low-income
countries (e.g., China) exceeding that of high-wage countries.
5 This finding is consistent with recent work highlighting the differen-
tial impact of offshoring by worker skill type. Hummels et al. (2011) use
matched worker and firm data from Denmark and find that offshoring
raises skilled worker wages but lowers unskilled worker wages, while
exporting raises the wages of all types of workers.
6 Our results corroborate results on employment declines within manu-
facturing by Harrison and McMillan (2011), who use firm-level data on
multinational manufacturing firms, but they stand in contrast to Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2009), who do not distinguish between high-wage and
low-wage affiliate employment and find that offshoring is unambiguously
positive for U.S. employment.
7 Other scholarship has documented the cost of trade-induced shifts in
employment. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) use a Brazilian trade
reform to document significant short-run costs to workers and sticky inter-
sectoral labor reallocation. Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010)
develop a theoretical model showing that adjustment costs for workers
are likely to be significant and can explain why there is likely to be slug-
gish reallocation and short-term negative wage effects on workers under
trade liberalization. Cosar (2011) also explores sluggish labor market
adjustments by developing a two-sector small, open economy, overlap-
ping-generations model that is calibrated to Brazilian data. The paper
finds that human capital is a much bigger barrier to labor mobility than
search frictions.
8 See, for example, Katz and Summers (1989) and Krueger and Sum-
mers (1988).
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impact of trade and offshoring from other changes in the
labor market. Two primary identification challenges exist.
First, it may be that trade and offshoring are the result of
changes in the domestic labor market. For example, if firms
choose to move operations offshore in response to changes
in the domestic labor market (e.g., unions), this reverse
causality would invalidate the causal interpretation of our
results. Second, it may be that technological change is
correlated with trade in a manner preventing causal inter-
pretation of our coefficient estimates. For example, if more
routine tasks are more easily performed overseas or auto-
mated, we will be unable to accurately characterize the
counterfactual of how wages would have evolved in the
absence of globalization. Insofar as some workers face
competitive pressure from low-wage workers in foreign
countries and automation, it will be difficult to separately
identify the impact of either exposure. We attempt to
address these concerns in several ways. First, by combining
industry-level trade or offshoring data with individual-level
information on wages and worker characteristics, we hope
to sidestep the issue of reverse causality since it is difficult
for one worker to affect aggregate trade outcomes. Second,
we pay considerable attention to capturing technological
change across industries that could influence both worker
wages and globalization outcomes. We include annual mea-
sures of total factor productivity, capital accumulation, the
price of investment goods by industry, and computer use
rates by industry and occupation, which represents our best
attempt to account for technical change that could poten-
tially affect workers directly. Third, we explore the robust-
ness of our results to instrumental variable estimation,
where we exploit factors that should affect the tradability of
certain goods, or the desirability of certain offshore loca-
tions (results available in online appendixes). These instru-
ments may themselves be endogenous, however. Conse-
quently, we focus our attention mainly on results that rely
on fixed effects by industry and occupation and the avail-
able control variables to measure the impact of globaliza-
tion on workers. The focus of this paper is on the impor-
tance of occupation versus industry-level measures of
exposure to globalization, and that focus is important
regardless of identification issues, which will continue to
remain a challenge. In the absence of a ‘‘clean’’ natural
experiment or a fully compelling instrument for the trad-
ability of certain occupations, our results must be inter-
preted with appropriate caution.9
FIGURE 1.—TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE SECTORS
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Employment and wage calculations are based on the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG). Sample includes all part-time and full-time workers. Wages are in 2005 dollars. The
definition of routine workers is based on occupational task content. Details are available in the data appendix.
9 In a recent paper, Jensen and Kletzer (2005) attempt to measure the
tradability of service sector goods using an approach that considers the
spatial concentration of service industries and occupations. They posit
that more spatially concentrated industries or occupations are more trad-
able and find evidence consistent with this hypothesis in U.S. data. We
chose not to pursue this strategy, as geographical concentration may
reflect other factors, such as state-specific regulations that lead to cluster-
ing of certain industries or occupations.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
our data; documents broad trends in trade, offshoring,
wages, and employment; and presents the empirical specifi-
cation. Section III presents our main empirical findings
regarding the impact of offshoring and trade on domestic
wages and employment at the occupation versus the indus-
try level. Section IV concludes.
II. Data Description, Empirical Strategy, and Trends
A. Data Description
Our sample of U.S. workers is taken from the Current
Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups for
1983 to 2002, which provides data for over 3.4 million
workers who are assigned a consistent classification for
their industry and occupation during the period.10 Offshore
activity in each industry is measured by the total employ-
ment of foreign affiliates among multinational U.S. firms,
separated into high- and low-income affiliate locations, as
collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).11
Our data on import penetration and export shares are taken
from Bernard at al. (2006), which we recalculated and
updated through 2002. Since relative price series for
imports and exports are incomplete, we substitute for prices
by using the share of exports in production and import
penetration at the four-digit SIC 1987 level.12 We control
for productivity changes that could also affect labor demand
as well as wages using the NBER’s calculations of total fac-
tor productivity provided by Wayne Gray. This data source
also provides us with measures of the prices of investment
goods, capital-to-labor ratios, and the real price of ship-
ments by industry and year.13 These are included in our
main specifications to control for technological change that
could also affect wage rates. Finally, we match our workers
to information on computer use rates by industry and occu-
pation from CPS computer supplements conducted during
our sample period (1984, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2000). Using
the available surveys, we interpolate and extrapolate com-
puter use rates for the entire window.14 Summary statistics
for the individual worker sample matched to our offshoring,
trade, technology, and price data are available in table A1.
We use Autor et al.’s (2003) distinction between routine
and nonroutine tasks to allow us to separately identify the
impact of different measures of globalization across differ-
ent types of workers. To the extent that routine tasks are
more easily offshored or replaced with imports, we would
expect globalization to have a larger impact on workers per-
forming these types of tasks. Autor et al. (2003) describe
routine jobs as ‘‘tasks that can be expressed using proce-
dural or ‘rules-based’ logic, that is, codified in a fully speci-
fied sequence of logical programming commands (‘If-
Then-Do’ statements) that designate unambiguously what
actions the machine will perform and in what sequence at
each contingency to achieve the desired result.’’ While they
use routineness to designate which jobs can be easily per-
formed by computers, we would argue that routine jobs are
also more readily codified, communicated, and consequently
transferred overseas. Examples of these jobs include attach-
ing hands to faces of watches, sewing fasteners and decora-
tive trimming to articles, and services tasks that we think of
as offshorable, such as answering telephones.
Following Autor et al. (2003), we aggregate five mea-
sures of the routineness of tasks into a single index for each
occupation k. Two indicators, Routine Manual and Routine
Cognitive, measure the routineness of tasks by occupation
in each of these dimensions. These range from 1 for tasks
that are not routine to 10 for tasks that are fully routine. The
three other measures are (1) Direction, Control, and Plan-
ning of Activities (DCP), which measures non routine cog-
nitive tasks; (2) Eye, Foot, and Hand coordination (EFH)
activities, which require nonroutine manual task comple-
tion; and (3) the Math indicator, which measures the quanti-
tative or analytical reasoning skills required. The index of
routineness by worker education level, industry, and year is
given by:
Routinek
¼ Routine Cognitivek þ RoutineManualk
Routine Cognitivek þ RoutineManualk þ DCPk þ EFHk þMathk :
The index ranges from 0 to 1.15 The last three terms,
DCP, EFH, and Math, refer to cognitive tasks that are
higher order in their complexity and presumably are asso-
10 We express our gratitude to David Autor for providing us with con-
cordances that provided a consistent coding scheme of industries and
occupations for the period. The CPS occupation and industry codes were
reclassified in 2003 to correspond to the North American Industrial Clas-
sification System, which made it difficult to compare data before and after
the change. We begin with 1984 because occupation codes for the 1979–
1981 period are not consistent with the classification for later years, and
we use lags in our empirical specification that lead us to drop 1983.
11 The BEA sample of multinational firms accounted for 80% of total out-
put in manufacturing in 1980, suggesting that the coverage is fairly exten-
sive. However, using these data, we are unable to distinguish between
imports from affiliates (arm’s-length trade between firms) and imports from
nonaffiliates.
12 Results using prices instead of quantities are available in the online
appendix. The results are qualitatively similar to our main results using
quantities.
13 These data were aggregated from the four-digit to three-digit SIC
level using the employment distribution in 1979. The three-digit SIC level
was converted to our industry classification scheme using a concordance
provided by David Autor that was a census-based scheme that consis-
tently defined industries for our sample period. A similar method was
used to match CPS workers to the trade data.
14 These data were also provided by David Autor and are used in Autor
et al. (1998).
15 See Autor et al. (2003) for a thorough description of these variables.
Our calculation of routine is the sum of routine manual tasks (Finger Dex-
terity) and routine nonmanual (Set Limits, Tolerances, or Standards), as a
share of those tasks and nonroutine manual (Eye, Hand, Foot), nonroutine
analytic (General Educational Development, Mathematics), and nonrou-
tine interactive (Direction, Control, and Planning) tasks. More details on
this classification scheme are available in the online appendix.
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ciated with larger costs of performing outside a firm’s cen-
tral location.
B. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is to regress log wages of worker i
in industry j in period t (Wijt) on lagged measures of expo-
sure to offshoring and international trade (Gijt–1) using
annual data from 1983 to 2002, first at the industry level
and subsequently at the occupation level, which we will
define below. This paper examines the impact of globaliza-
tion (i.e., offshoring and trade) on wages and the domestic
labor market response to offshoring and trade in the short
run. After controlling for all observables such as education,
age, sex, ethnicity, and experience, workers in a frictionless
world could costlessly move from one industry or occupa-
tion to another. We test this hypothesis and find that barriers
exist at the occupation but not at the industry level.
We use lagged measures of exposure to offshoring and
trade for two reasons. First, since offshoring requires time
to implement, and wage adjustment is not instantaneous, it
is unlikely that the causal effect of offshoring on wages will
play out within a single calendar year. Second, within a
given year, offshoring, trade exposure, and wages are likely
to be affected by simultaneous shocks. We use four mea-
sures of exposure to offshoring and international trade: off-
shoring to low-income affiliate locations, offshoring to
high-income affiliate locations, export shares, and import
penetration. To allow for the possibility that offshoring to
low-income locations might have different effects from off-
shoring to high-income locations, we include as separate
regressors the log of employment in sector j by U.S.-based
multinationals in low- and high-income countries.
There are three additional challenges to identifying the
causal effect of globalization on wages. First, the industries
that are most likely to globalize may also be those with
lower wages or greater volatility. We address this concern
by including industry fixed effects (Ij) in our specification.
Second, globalization and wages may be jointly affected by
common time-varying shocks, such as the business cycle
and exchange rate fluctuations. We control for these by
including time fixed effects (dt). Third, we control for time-
varying shocks at the industry level that could be con-
founded with changes in globalization by adding a number
of controls. TFPjt1 captures changes in productivity by
industry and year that could affect demand for labor.16 We
also attempt to capture productivity changes including two
(arguably) exogenous measures, the price of investment
goods and computer use rates. The price of investment
goods PINVjt1 captures in part the role of falling computer
prices and the potential impact of labor-saving technology
on labor market outcomes. We also control for industry fac-
tor intensity (lagged capital to labor ratio KLRATIOjt1)
and computer use rates by industry and year (COMPjt) to
account for contemporaneous changes in an industry’s wage
rate based on the ability to substitute for labor with compu-
ters.17 Finally, we control for individual characteristics
including age, sex, race, experience, education, and location
(Zijt):
Wijt ¼ b0Zijt þ b1Gjt1 þ b2TFPjt1 þ b3PINVjt1
þ b4KLRATIOjt1 þ b5COMPjt
þ b6dt þ b7Ij þ eijt: ð1aÞ
To examine the relationship between wages and globali-
zation at the occupation level, we retain the same setup as
in equation (1a) but modify the G vector to create a measure
of occupational exposure to offshoring or trade. Each vari-
able in the G vector was created from a merged data set of
BEA offshore employment data, trade data, and CPS
monthly outgoing rotation group individual-level data, by
industry and year. We calculate for each occupation its ex-
posure to trade using the distribution of workers employed
in this occupation across industries in 1983. For each occu-
pation k and industry j, we have akj83 ¼ Lkj83Lk83 , where Lkj83 is
the total number of workers in occupation k and industry j
in 1983 and Lk83 is the total number of workers across all
industries in occupation k. We then calculate occupation-
specific import penetration in year t for occupation k as
XJ
j¼1
akj83IMPjt;
where IMPjt is the measure of import penetration for goods
in industry j in year t. We continue to control for technolo-
gical changes by industry and set these technological
changes equal to unity for workers outside manufactur-
ing.18
This leads to a specification of the form:
Wijkt ¼ b0Zijkt þ b1Gkt1 þ b2TFPjt1 þ b3PINVjt1
þ b4KLRATIOjt1 þ b5COMPkt þ b6dt
þ b7Ij þ b8Occupationk þ eijkt; ð1bÞ
where k indexes the worker’s occupation, and workers
within the same k occupation may be in different j indus-
tries.19 Our G vector is now an occupation-specific measure
for each worker, and we have added occupation fixed
16 Since total factor productivity is a function of wages, we estimate our
equations with and without total factor productivity. The results are simi-
lar with and without controlling for TFP.
17 Our results are similar if we control for computer use rates in the pre-
vious year.
18 An alternative approach would be to create occupation-specific mea-
sures of each of our control variables. In the online appendix, we estimate
models with occupational-specific measures of TFP, the price of invest-
ment goods, and the capital-to-labor ratio. The results are qualitatively
similar to the results presented in the main text. These are presented in
table A9.
19 For workers outside manufacturing, the control variables for TFP,
PIINV, and REALSHIP are not available and are therefore assumed con-
stant in our main specifications.
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effects to absorb variation specific to time-invariant features
of occupations. Note that we also control for variation in
computer use rates by occupation and year, which is meant
to account for wage changes driven by the ability of some
occupations to benefit from computer technology (Autor
et al., 1998). We will estimate this specification for all
occupations separately by the degree of how routine the
tasks are within a given occupation and for samples of
workers who switch occupations. One important implicit
assumption in our approach is that barriers to changing
occupations are similar across routine and nonroutine occu-
pations. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) show this to be
the case. They also decompose occupation switching across
routine and nonroutine occupations and show that between
1968 and 1997, workers were not able to escape routine
occupations by switching into nonroutine ones.
C. Trends in Offshoring, Trade, Employment, and Wages
In this section, we outline broad trends in the data for
employment, wages, and the relationship between wages
and measures of globalization. In figure 1, we compare the
trends in employment and wages in the manufacturing sec-
tor alongside the same trends in the service sector between
1979 and 2002. We present these trends separately for
workers performing routine and nonroutine tasks. Total
manufacturing employment (using the CPS employment
numbers) fell from 22 to 17 million from 1979 to 2002,
with rapid declines at the beginning of the early 1980s and
in the late 1990s. Within manufacturing, the labor force has
become increasingly high skilled, with a large decline of
roughly 6 million in the number of workers in routine occu-
pations and a modest increase of roughly 1 million in the
number of workers performing nonroutine occupations.
In contrast, demand for both types of workers continued
to grow in the service sector, and many of the displaced rou-
tine manufacturing workers may have found employment in
the service sector. These trends have important implications
for the U.S. wage distribution. As shown at the bottom of
figure 1, where we report the real hourly wage among CPS
workers, manufacturing workers enjoyed a large wage pre-
mium during the entire period among both routine and non-
routine workers. Insofar as manufacturing provided an
opportunity to earn high relative wages, even for low-skill
workers, its decline might also have played a role in increas-
ing U.S. income inequality during the period.20
The three panels displaying wage trends exhibit signifi-
cant differences during the sample period. Real wages grew
in the 1980s, fell or stagnated in the 1990s, and then begin
increasing around 1995 to 1996. Over the entire period, the
gap between manufacturing and service wages narrowed,
particularly from the mid-1990s onward. These different
trends are one factor that leads us to break our samples into
different time periods. We turn now to an examination of
how offshoring and trade may be related to these employ-
ment and wage trends within manufacturing and in the
overall economy.
As shown in figure 2, foreign affiliate employment in
low-income countries by U.S.-based multinationals nearly
doubled over the entire sample period, while affiliate em-
ployment in high-income countries remained roughly con-
stant. The increase in developing country activity has been
accompanied by a reduction in the U.S. workforce for these
parents from almost 12 million workers in 1982 to 7 million
workers in 2002.
In figure 3, we report changes in the distribution of occu-
pation wage residuals across the 476 occupations in the
CPS. Each point in the figure represents the occupation-
specific wage premium in 1983 and 2002. The wage pre-
mium was calculated by taking the residual in a regression
of real log wages on education category dummies; experi-
ence category dummies; an interaction of education and
experience; and controls for sex, race, year, and state.21
These premiums were then collapsed into one term for each
occupation and year. In order to compare the occupational
wage residual changes by their potential exposure to off-
shoring, we stratify occupations by whether they are above
the median occupation in terms of routine task content. As
FIGURE 2.—TRENDS IN DOMESTIC AND AFFILIATE EMPLOYMENT AMONG
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
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Authors’ calculations based on the most comprehensive available data, and based on firm-level sur-
veys on U.S. direct investment abroad, collected each year by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
U.S. Department of Commerce. Using these data, we compute the number of employees hired abroad by
country and year and then aggregate employment by low (high) income country according to World
Bank income classifications.
20 See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) for a review of these trends. It
is worth noting that while the trends in figure 1 are informative, they do
not control for other factors that affect income, such as sex, age, and
experience. We redid the trends in wages by educational attainment using
wage residuals. These wage residuals were computed using Lemieux’s
(2006) approach for each educational category separately. We also added
industry dummies to control for interindustry wage differentials. The
wage residuals show similar trends, with falling wage premiums for less
educated workers and rising wage premium for more educated workers.
Similar results are observed for wage premiums when workers are strati-
fied by the routineness of occupation. Results are available from the
authors on request.
21 The data sets are made available online for replication at the Data-
verse Network Project.
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shown in figure 3, over the sample period, routine occupa-
tions were more likely to experience declines in wage pre-
miums, possibly because these tasks can be performed over-
seas at lower cost. Of 240 routine occupations, 187
experienced wage premium declines and only 53 had
increases in their wage premium. In contrast, among 236
nonroutine occupations, 134 experienced increases and only
102 experienced declines.
Before estimating equations 1a and 1b, in table 1 we pro-
vide a descriptive regression that is consistent with the
results presented in figure 3. In particular, table 1 shows that
an industry’s share of routine jobs in 1983 is a good indica-
tor of subsequent offshoring to low-income locations and
increasing import penetration. The dependent variables are
the log difference between 1983 and 2002 in employment
offshored to low-income countries (in columns 1 and 2) or
high-income countries (in columns 3 and 4) and the change
in import penetration (in columns 5 and 6). As shown in col-
umn 1, an industry’s share of routine jobs in 1983 is a signif-
icant predictor of the subsequent increase in employment
offshored to low-income countries, explaining roughly 7%
of the variation across industries as a single regressor. We
estimate that industries with 1 percentage point more routine
jobs in 1983 experienced a 5.1% increase in offshore
TABLE 1.—OLS ESTIMATES OF CHANGE IN OFFSHORING AND IMPORT PENETRATION GIVEN INDUSTRY SKILL COMPOSITION IN 1983
Dependent Variable: Log Difference in Employment
Offshored (1983–2002)
Dependent Variable:
Import Penetration
Difference
(1983–2002)
Low-Income
Countries
High-Income
Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry share of routine jobs, 1983 5.132** 5.501** 0.980 0.053 1.217*** 1.237***
(2.40) (2.59) (2.03) (2.26) (0.34) (0.33)
Difference in log of price of investment
between 1983 and 2002
0.262 0.234 0.079
(0.45) (0.40) (0.06)
Difference in total factor productivity
level between 1983 and 2002
0.084 0.056 0.0242**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.01)
Difference in capital to labor ratio between
1983 and 2002
0.230 1.218 0.249
(1.21) (1.06) (0.16)
Difference in computer use rates between
1983 and 2002
0.441 0.391 0.028
(0.68) (0.59) (0.09)
Number of observations 66 59 66 59 66 61
R2 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.35
Affiliate (or offshore) employment data are taken from the BEA annual survey of U.S. firms with multinational affiliates for 1983–2002. Low-income countries are defined according to the World Bank income cate-
gories. Employment data are taken from all workers in the Current Population Surveys Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups for the same period. Import penetration and export share are taken from Bernard et al. (2006).
Investment good prices, total factor productivity measures, and the capital-to-labor ratio by industry and year are taken from the NBER productivity database. Computer use rates are taken fromOctober CPS supplements
during the sample period. Details for each of the data sources are available in the data appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
FIGURE 3.—OCCUPATIONAL WAGE PREMIUMS IN 1983 AND 2002 AMONG ROUTINE AND NONROUTINE OCCUPATIONS
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Wage premiums are calculated by a standard Mincerian regression of the log wage on education, experience, age, sex, race, year fixed efffects, and state fixed effects among all workers in the CPS MORG between
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employment to low-income countries by 2002, and this
result is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, in
column 3, there is no significant relationship with offshoring
to high-income countries. The significant relationship be-
tween an industry’s share of routine jobs in 1983 and subse-
quent offshoring to low-income countries, which stands in
contrast to high-income-country offshoring, is one reason to
maintain the distinction between offshoring to high- and
low-income countries in the subsequent analysis.
Column 5 shows that the industry share of routine jobs in
1983 is also a significant predictor of future increases in
import penetration. We find a 1.2 percentage point increase
in our import penetration measure among industries with 1
percentage point more routine jobs, suggesting that indus-
tries with more routine jobs have also faced greater import
competition. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we include a range of
additional predictors and continue to find similar effects for
the industry share of routine jobs. Our control variables,
which include industry averages of the price of investment
goods, total factor productivity, capital-to-labor ratios, and
computer use rates, do not qualitatively affect the results.
In the remainder of the paper, we continue to make a dis-
tinction between high- and low-income offshore locations and
to differentiate workers by the routine content of their jobs.
The patterns in the figures and table 1 indicate rising trade and
offshoring to low-income countries in industries with workers
whose jobs are characterized by a high routine content.
III. Offshoring, Trade, and the Impact on Domestic
Workers
A. Wage Impacts of Offshoring and Trade at the Industry
versus Occupation Level
In table 2, we present our main results showing how the
impact of offshoring and trade are quite different when
using industry versus occupation measures of exposure. In
the first four columns, we present our estimates for equation
(1a), which defines exposure to trade or offshoring at the
industry level. In the last four columns, we redo the analysis
using our occupation exposure measure, as outlined in
equation (1b). We also present the main results where we
stratify the workers based on the routine content of the
worker’s occupation, since we anticipate that routine tasks
are more easily monitored offshore than more complex
tasks, and so domestic workers performing these tasks may
be more affected by offshoring and trade (Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg 2008). Note that the standard errors are
clustered by industry and five-year period in columns 1
through 4 and by occupation and five-year period in the last
four columns. Industry regressions include industry fixed
effects, and occupation regressions include occupation as
well as industry fixed effects.
Columns 1 through 4 of table 2 identify the impact on
wages of workers in industries that were more exposed to
international trade or offshoring during the 1984–2002
period.22 In these four columns, only workers within the
manufacturing sector are included in the estimation. The
results suggest a very limited role for offshoring or trade in
explaining log wages. There is no statistically significant rela-
tionship between low-income-affiliate employment, lagged
export share, or lagged import penetration and industry-level
wages; indeed, the point estimates are close to 0. There is a
positive and statistically significant relationship between
high-income-affiliate employment and domestic wages,
although the magnitude is not large: the point estimate sug-
gests that a 1% increase in affiliate employment in high-
TABLE 2.—OLS ESTIMATES OF WAGE DETERMINANTS USING OCCUPATIONAL VERSUS INDUSTRY EXPOSURE TO OFFSHORING AND TRADE, 1984–2002
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Offshoring and Trade Measured by
Industry-Specific Exposure,
Manufacturing Only
Offshoring and Trade Measured
by Occupation-Specific
Exposure, All Sectors
Variable
All
Occupations
Most
Routine
Intermediate
Routine
Least
Routine
All
Occupations
Most
Routine
Intermediate
Routine
Least
Routine
Lagged log of low-income-
affiliate employment
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.0401** 0.0702*** 0.018 0.072
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.056)
Lagged log of high-income-
affiliate employment
0.0143*** 0.00793* 0.011 0.0239*** 0.0339** 0.0508*** 0.003 0.045
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.048)
Lagged export share 0.022 0.021 0.002 0.047 0.255** 0.667*** 0.232 0.815*
(0.043) (0.058) (0.048) (0.045) (0.121) (0.157) (0.184) (0.420)
Lagged import penetration 0.077 0.090 0.042 0.050 0.290*** 0.296*** 0.761 1.083
(0.050) (0.061) (0.057) (0.074) (0.091) (0.099) (0.466) (0.750)
Number of observations 551,528 316,048 150,319 85,161 3,068,095 1,109,835 1,156,208 802,052
R2 0.46 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.42 0.54 0.40
See table 1 for sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The workers are taken from CPS samples from 1984 to 2002, with their lagged values of the independent
variables taken from 1983 to 2001. The standard errors are clustered by industry and five-year period in columns 1–4 and by occupation and five-year period in columns 5–8. The classification of occupations into rou-
tine categories is determined by the proportion of tasks that are routine in each occupation, with low being occupations with more than two-thirds, intermediate being between one-third and two-thirds, and high being
occupations with less than one-third of tasks designated routine. We also control for the lagged log price of investment, lagged total factor productivity, and lagged capital to labor ratio among manufacturing workers.
Among nonmanufacturing workers, these controls are set equal to unity. Wage specifications control for a worker’s gender, age, race, experience, whether in a union, and include industry, year, education, and state
fixed effects. The occupation-specific exposure regressions also include two-digit occupation fixed effects. Controls for computer use rates are imputed by the worker’s industry (columns 1–4) and by occupation (col-
umns 5–8). Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
22 Note that we exclude 1983 for consistency with our occupation
results, which can only be estimated from 1984 to 2002, since occupation
was coded consistently only from 1983 and on, and we are using lagged
measures of our independent variables.
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income countries is associated with a 0.01% increase in
wages, and this is found even for workers in the most routine
occupations. In these first four columns, which rely on differ-
ences in exposure to trade or offshoring across industries, the
evidence suggests that trade has no substantial negative effect
on worker wages.
In columns 5 through 8 of table 2, we present results
from specification (1b) where we measure exposure to trade
or offshoring at the occupation level. The effects of both
offshoring and trade are larger in sign and generally signifi-
cant at the 5% level, in contrast to the industry-level results
reported in the first four columns. In the first row of column
5, the coefficient on low-income affiliate employment sug-
gests that a 10% increase in employment offshored within
an occupation is associated with a 0.4% wage reduction for
US workers. For workers in the most routine occupations,
we find that a 10% increase in low-income affiliate employ-
ment abroad is associated with a 0.7% decline in domestic
wages, whereas workers in less routine occupations were
largely unaffected by offshoring. Although the magnitude
of the effect is small, the results are consistent with an inter-
pretation that workers in low-income locations perform the
same tasks that low-skilled workers perform in the United
States and are therefore substitutes for workers in the
United States.
We also find a positive effect of lagged high-income-
affiliate employment on wages. Workers in high-income
locations appear to perform tasks that are complementary to
workers in the United States, and so expansion of employ-
ment in high-income countries can benefit domestic workers.
These results are robust to a range of specification choices,
including whether we use prices of imported and exported
goods instead of quantities, and our chosen set of control
variables, such as controlling for the real price of shipments
by sector to account for variation in product demand.23 The
results are qualitatively similar to the results presented here,
and are available in the online appendix.
Our results indicate that a 10% increase in occupational
exposure to import competition is associated with nearly a
3% decline in real wages for workers who perform routine
tasks. While some occupations have experienced no in-
crease in import competition (such as teachers), import
competition in other occupations (such as shoe manufactur-
ing) has increased by as much as 40 percentage points.24
For occupations with significant export activity, wages are
positively linked to export growth. For these workers, a 10
percentage point increase in export share at the occupation
level is associated with a 6.6 percentage point increase in
wages over the sample period.
Krugman (2008) and Feenstra (2008) both hypothesize
that the effects of international trade and offshoring may
have increased recently relative to earlier decades. In table 3,
we split the sample into earlier and later time periods. In par-
TABLE 3.—OLS ESTIMATES OF WAGE DETERMINANTS USING OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO OFFSHORING AND TRADE AMONG SUBSAMPLES OF CPS WORKERS, 1984–2002
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Specification
Lagged Log of
Low-Income
Affiliate
Lagged Log of
High-Income
Affiliate
Lagged
Export
Share
Lagged
Import
Penetration Observations R2
1984–1991 0.003 0.005 0.06 0.215*** 1,390,331 0.52
(0.012) (0.01) (0.109) (0.067)
1992–2002 0.0558*** 0.0449*** 0.490*** 0.321*** 1,677,763 0.49
(0.013) (0.011) (0.081) (0.062)
1984–1996 0.015 0.0102 0.181** 0.261*** 2,181,111 0.51
(0.009) (0.008) (0.076) (0.057)
1997–2002 0.107*** 0.0946*** 0.478*** 0.306*** 886,983 0.48
(0.026) (0.024) (0.118) (0.093)
Female 0.0477*** 0.0434*** 0.376*** 0.178*** 1,491,461 0.49
(0.013) (0.012) (0.093) (0.038)
Union 0.004 0.011 0.104 0.075 549,055 0.37
(0.01) (0.009) (0.077) (0.073)
High school or less 0.0407*** 0.0319*** 0.227*** 0.209*** 1,475,119 0.44
(0.009) (0.008) (0.081) (0.049)
College or more 0.0250** 0.0228** 0.12 0.116 1,592,975 0.44
(0.011) (0.01) (0.073) (0.111)
Over age 40 0.0560*** 0.0482*** 0.11 0.202*** 1,262,929 0.48
(0.01) (0.009) (0.071) (0.053)
Over age 50 0.0552*** 0.0487*** 0.11 0.287*** 550,041 0.48
(0.013) (0.012) (0.088) (0.064)
See table 1 for sources.
Each row represents a separate regression. The independent variables are listed in the column headings, and the subsample of interest is listed in the row heading. Robust standard errors are clustered by occupation
and five-year period and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Wage specifications control for a worker’s gender, age, race, experience, whether in a union, and imputed computer use rate by
occupation and include year, education, state, industry, and two-digit occupation fixed effects. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
23 The results indicate that workers with price decreases in their product
market have suffered the largest wage declines, with this pattern most
pronounced in routine occupations. Similar to our core results, however,
this effect is observed only using occupational exposure measures of
import price changes. Special thanks to Lawrence Edwards for generous
use of his price series data on imports. Other specifications we have tested
include removing measures of TFP and controlling for price changes in
the service sector using a CPI/PPI index, both of which provide results
similar to those presented in table 2. Likewise, the results including the
real price of shipments are similar to the results in table 2.
24 See the online appendix for further information on import exposure
by occupation.
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ticular, we allow the impact of globalization to vary between
1984 and 1991, and 1992 through 2002, when our sample
ends. We also explore whether the impact of globalization
varied for female workers, unionized workers, across educa-
tion levels, and for different age groups. The results in table
3 suggest that there is no significant association between log
wages and employment in offshore locations in the early
years of our sample (1984–1991, 1984–1996). However, in
the later periods (1992–2002, 1997–2002), worker wages are
negatively and significantly associated with increased off-
shore employment in low-income-affiliate locations. In the
years 1997 to 2002, the coefficient estimates in the fourth
row of table 3 indicate that a 10% increase in low-income-
affiliate employment is associated with a 1% decrease in
domestic wages. These negative coefficients contrast with
the positive coefficients on high-income-affiliate employ-
ment. For 1997 through 2002, a 10% increase in high-
income-affiliate employment is associated with nearly a 1%
increase in domestic wages.
Table 3 also reports the coefficient on lagged imports and
exports, measured at the occupation level. The point esti-
mates for occupation-specific import penetration are statis-
tically significant across all time periods, with the coeffi-
cients ranging from 0.21 to 0.32. These coefficients
indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in import pene-
tration is associated with a wage decline in the exposed
occupation of 2% to 3%. The coefficients become larger
and more negative in magnitude in the later time periods.
The evidence also points to a positive and significant asso-
ciation between export share and domestic wages, but the
point estimates are positive and significant for export share
only in the later part of the sample period.
In table 3, we also explore heterogeneity in our results
across different demographic groups. Anecdotes in the pop-
ular press and elsewhere suggest that women, union work-
ers, and older workers may have been disproportionately
affected by international competition. If we restrict the sam-
ple to either women or union workers, there is no evidence
that their wages were more negatively affected than the rest
of the sample. In fact, the wages of unionized workers
appear to have been relatively unaffected by export activity
or import competition. However, the wages of workers
without higher education and older workers do appear to
have been disproportionately affected by offshoring activ-
ities, as the point estimates are larger for these groups of
workers. The estimates in table 3 indicate that all of the
negative and significant effects of offshore employment and
import penetration were concentrated on workers with a
high school education or less.
Since the results point to much stronger effects of off-
shore activities on domestic wages in the later part of the
sample period, we reproduce table 2 for the 1997 through
2002 period in table 4. The results confirm that for the
last five years of our sample, offshoring and international
trade exerted much larger effects on occupation-specific
wages than the earlier years. The results also confirm that
over the most recent sample period, industry-level wage
effects are negligible. In columns 1 through 4, all but two
of the point estimates are statistically insignificant and the
magnitudes are close to 0, indicating that offshoring or
trade does not significantly affect industry-level wage pre-
miums.
Columns 5 through 8 suggest that occupation-specific
changes in offshoring and trade are associated with signifi-
cant wage effects, particularly for workers in the most rou-
tine occupations. For these workers, a 10% increase in off-
shoring to low-income countries is associated with a 2%
decrease in wages. For most workers, however, a 10 percen-
tage point increase in high-income-affiliate employment is
associated with a 1.7% increase in wages. One explanation
is that workers in high-income locations perform tasks that
are complementary to routine workers in the United States.
TABLE 4.—OLS ESTIMATES OF WAGE DETERMINANTS USING OCCUPATIONAL VERSUS INDUSTRY EXPOSURE TO OFFSHORING AND TRADE, 1997–2002
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Offshoring and Trade Measured by
Industry-Specific Exposure, Manufacturing Only
Offshoring and Trade Measured by
Occupation-Specific Exposure, All Sectors
Variable
All
Occupations
Most
Routine
Intermediate
Routine
Least
Rotine
All
Occupations
Most
Routine
Intermediate
Routine
Least
Rotine
Lagged log of low-income-
affiliate employment
0.009 0.005 0.0221*** 0.002 0.107*** .198*** 0.147*** 0.330*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.040) (0.038) (0.050) (0.165)
Lagged log of high-income-
affiliate employment
0.002 0.014 0.004 0.016 0.0947** 0.169*** 0.140*** 0.299**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.022) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.143)
Lagged export share 0.021 0.111 0.039 0.049 0.478*** 0.999*** 0.292 0.808
(0.072) (0.078) (0.092) (0.075) (0.178) (0.240) (0.271) (0.948)
Lagged import penetration 0.119 0.196** 0.067 0.094 0.306** 0.437** 0.035 1.668
(0.073) (0.094) (0.150) (0.176) (0.146) (0.160) (0.587) (1.419)
Number of observations 132,104 71,985 36,982 23,137 886,984 291,894 337,057 258,033
R2 0.44 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.48 0.39 0.51 0.37
See table 1 for sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The workers are taken from CPS samples from 1997 to 2002, with their lagged values of the independent
variables taken from 1996 to 2001. The standard errors are clustered by industry and five-year period in columns 1–4, and by occupation and five-year period in columns 5–8. The classification of occupations into
routine categories is determined by the proportion of tasks that are routine in each occupation, with low being occupations with more than two-thirds, intermediate being between one-third and two-thirds, and high
being occupations with less than one-third of tasks designated routine. We also control for the lagged log price of investment, lagged total factor productivity, and lagged capital-to-labor ratio among manufacturing
workers. Among nonmanufacturing workers, these controls are set equal to unity. Wage specifications control for a worker’s gender, age, race, experience, whether in a union, and include industry, year, education,
and state fixed effects. The occupation-specific exposure regressions also include two-digit occupation fixed effects. Controls for computer use rates are imputed by the worker’s industry (columns 1–4) and by occu-
pation (columns 5–8). Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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A 1% increase in export shares is associated with a 1%
increase in wages, while a 1% increase in import penetra-
tion is associated with a 0.44% decline in wages. The
effects of these globalization measures are generally small
in magnitude and insignificant for individuals who work in
the occupations with the least routine content.
While we control for a number of observables, there are
other shocks that might be difficult to control for and could
affect workers in routine occupations. To verify that our
results are not driven by secular trends in which wage
changes, globalization, and technological change are all
moving together over time, we present a falsification exer-
cise in table 5. In particular, we regress current period wage
changes for 1984 through 1989 on future globalization
shocks for 2002. Our future globalization shocks are the
logs of low- and high-income-affiliate employment in 2002,
as well as export shares and import penetration in 2002. If
the analysis is driven by spurious trends, the coefficient on
2002 measures of globalization should be significant in
explaining wages for the 1984 through 1989 period. Table 5
shows that 2002 measures of globalization do not signifi-
cantly affect wages in the earlier period. In contrast, 2002
measures of globalization do significantly affect wages
from 1997 through 2002. For example, our offshoring mea-
sure to low-income countries is significantly negatively cor-
related with wage changes among workers during this later
period. This is new evidence that our results are not being
driven simply by a spurious correlation between offshoring
and domestic wage changes.25
B. Offshoring, Trade, and the Reallocation of Labor across
Sectors
In this section, we try to identify mechanisms for the dif-
ferences between industry-level and occupation-level expo-
sure to offshoring and trade. We begin by analyzing the rela-
tionship between offshoring and domestic manufacturing
employment. We then examine the wage consequences of
switching industries, sectors, and occupations using a panel
of CPS workers who are followed for more than one period.
In table 6, we present an analysis of employment trends in
manufacturing in response to offshoring. Our unit of analysis
is each Education Industry Year cell. There are 5 educa-
tion categories for workers, 67 manufacturing industries, and
19 years of data (1984–2002). In column 1, we present pooled
results for all industries, and in the remaining columns we
split industries by the fraction of an industry’s workforce per-
forming routine tasks. When we pool across all task types,
the results in column 1 indicate that the impact of offshoring
depends on whether affiliate employment is located in high-
or low-income countries. A 1% increase in employment in
low-income countries reduces domestic employment by
0.02%, while a 1% increase in employment in high-income
countries increases domestic employment by 0.07%. Break-
ing the results down according to how routine the workforce
is, we see that the negative effects of offshoring to low-
income countries are largest for workers in the most routine
industries. The point estimate in column 2, at 0.041, sug-
gests that a 1% increase in affiliate employment in low-
income locations is associated with a 0.041% reduction in
employment of workers in the most routine occupations.
In contrast, greater offshoring to high-wage countries is
associated with a significant increase in employment in the
United States. Across all workers, the evidence suggests
that a 1% increase in affiliate employment in high-income
locations is associated with a .074% increase in employ-
ment at home. For routine workers, the impact is more posi-
tive, with a 1 percentage point increase in offshore employ-
ment in high-income countries associated with a .15% to
.19% increase in U.S. employment. This evidence suggests
that offshore employment in high-income locations is com-
plementary with employment at home. The evidence pre-
sented in table 6 is consistent with Harrison and McMillan
(2011), who use firm-level BEA data to show that domestic
employment of U.S. multinationals is complementary with
their employment in high-income locations but that increas-
ing employment of U.S. firms in low-income locations sub-
stitutes for employment in the United States.26
TABLE 5.—FALSIFICATION EXERCISE USING EXPOSURE TO OFFSHORING AND
TRADE IN 2002 AND WAGE IMPACT BY PERIOD
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Offshoring and Trade Measured by
Occupation-Specific Exposure in 2002
Variable 1984–1989 1997–2002
Log of low-income-
affiliate employment in 2002
0.015 0.0862**
(0.055) (0.042)
Log of high-income-
affiliate employment in 2002
0.014 0.0769**
(0.050) (0.038)
Export share in 2002 0.079 0.445***
(0.248) (0.157)
Import penetration in 2002 0.118 0.358***
(0.150) (0.124)
Number of observations 1,036,302 886,958
R2 0.53 0.48
See table 1 for sources. Robust standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The independent variables reported for the globalization
exposure are taken from the worker’s occupational exposure in 2002. The sample in each column
includes workers in all sectors for the listed period. The regressions include the same controls that are
included in the regressions using occupational exposure in table 2. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
25 It is worth discussing alternative possibilities that could undermine
our interpretations of our findings. For example, it may be that even if the
United States engaged in autarky in this later period, domestic workers
would have been replaced by machines, thereby implicating offshoring
when the workers’ decline was inevitable. This possibility naturally can-
not be evaluated in our data. Also, if our technology control variables are
measured with error, it may be that the wage declines we observe are a
by-product of the substitutability between these workers and capital.
However, we would argue that the strong correlation between the timing
of increased offshore employment and declining domestic wages seems
unlikely to be fully explained by stories of this nature.
26 Our online appendix includes a rich set of robustness checks for these
results. Among these are a set of results based on instrumental variables
estimation where we instrument for trade and offshoring using the vari-
ables that capture changes over time in the cost of trade and offshoring.
The instruments are Internet access, telephone connections including cell
phone use, and the industry share of routine jobs. The results confirm the
negative relationship between offshoring to low-income countries, import
penetration, and manufacturing employment.
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The coefficients on offshoring in table 6 are significant
but small in magnitude and suggest both substitution (in
low-income countries) and complementarity (in high-
income locations). In contrast, the coefficients are large and
negative but imprecisely estimated for both import penetra-
tion and export activity. For the pooled sample, a 1 percen-
tage point increase in import penetration reduces U.S. man-
ufacturing employment by 0.61%. While it is not surprising
that the coefficient on import competition is negative, the
negative coefficient on sectoral export shares is less intui-
tive and deserves explanation. The negative coefficients
may indicate that export growth was labor saving for work-
ers with less than a college degree, which is sensible if a
significant degree of offshoring takes place through exports
for further processing. Likewise, the negative and signifi-
cant coefficient on total factor productivity suggests that
productivity growth has been labor saving for most educa-
tional categories.27 Productivity growth in manufacturing
has been achieved in conjunction with falling employment.
The results in table 6 suggest that productivity growth,
export growth, and import competition have been asso-
ciated with (sometimes significant) declines in domestic
manufacturing employment and that the effects of offshor-
ing have been smaller in magnitude and mixed in sign.
These results are important insofar as they suggest a fluid
labor market where changes in other factor prices and glo-
bal competition lead to employment reallocation. Further-
more, these results provide an explanation for our finding in
table 2 that the within-industry wage effects of trade and
offshoring are smaller than the within-occupation effects. If
trade and offshoring lead some workers to shift sectors (in
particular, to exit high-wage jobs in manufacturing), then it
is possible that the wages of those who retain their jobs or
find new jobs in the same industry are not significantly
affected by offshoring, whereas those who shift sectors or
occupations are more negatively affected.28 We examine
this conjecture in table 7.
To explore the impact of switching out of manufacturing
on wage outcomes, we construct a sample of manufacturing
workers observed in CPS samples in consecutive years
between 1983 and 2002. We regress the change in log wages
between period t and t þ 1 for a given worker on an indica-
tor for switching occupation, including a rich set of controls
for the worker’s age, sex, education, race, union status in
the first period, and industry in the first period. If switching
occupation is costly, it may explain why the negative impact
on wages is so large in our main results. As shown in table
7, the data indicate that trade-induced occupation switching
does indeed have serious negative wage consequences for
workers. Using our matched sample of CPS ORG workers
who are observed in consecutive years, we compare the
wage difference in period t and t þ 1 for workers who
switch occupations versus those who do not. In panel A, we
examine workers who switch across three-digit occupational
categories. In column 1, we examine the wage impact of all
occupations switched and find that the impact is negligible;
an occupation change is associated with a 0.54% increase in
wages. One possible explanation for this result is that some
TABLE 6.—OLS ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT DETERMINANTS IN MANUFACTURING, 1984–2002
Dependent Variable: Log U.S. Manufacturing Sector Employment
Variable All Most Routine Intermediate Routine Least Routine
Lagged log of low-income-affiliate employment 0.0202* 0.0413** 0.007 0.046
(0.011) (0.02) (0.021) (0.044)
Lagged log of high-income-affiliate employment 0.0736** 0.148** 0.192*** 0.013
(0.031) (0.064) (0.05) (0.132)
Lagged log of price of investment 0.124 0.489*** 0.197 0.094
(0.093) (0.16) (0.209) (0.52)
Lagged total factor productivity level 0.000 0.0680** 0.0612*** 0.602
(0.017) (0.033) (0.023) (0.632)
Lagged export share 0.393 0.555 0.112 0.216
(0.258) (0.666) (0.321) (1.326)
Lagged import penetration 0.614* 0.313 0.084 0.133
(0.356) (0.682) (0.338) (1.547)
Lagged capital to labor ratio 0.867** 0.983 1.108** 0.338
(0.373) (1.043) (0.436) (1.504)
Lagged computer use rates by industry 0.036 0.049 0.122 0.700
(0.147) (0.269) (0.207) (0.482)
Number of observations 6,399 1,662 4,248 489
R2 0.86 0.78 0.55 0.65
See table 1 for sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are clustered by industry. All models include year and industry fixed effects. Low-income-affiliate
employment is defined according to the World Bank income categories. The sample size corresponds to five education groupings  19 years  67 industries, less missing values. The results shown in columns 2–4
are (for column 2) industry and year combinations where more than two-thirds of the tasks are routine, (for column 3) cells where between one-third and two-thirds of tasks are routine, and (for column 4) cells where
than a one-third of the tasks are routine. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
27 The results in table 6 are robust to excluding total factor productivity
as a control variable.
28 In results available in the online appendix, we directly assess the
wage consequences among those who switch industries within manufac-
turing. We find that (1) switching within manufacturing has mild wage
consequences, (2) but leaving manufacturing has a more negative impact,
and (3) leaving manufacturing is particularly costly for workers who
switch occupations. These were not included in the main text due to space
considerations.
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switches are upward (as measured by average occupational
wages), and others are downward, leaving a mixed result for
all switches. This hypothesis is put forward in Trefler and
Liu (2011), who find evidence that switches of both types
are common in response to trade.
In order to examine the impact of trade-induced occupa-
tional switching on wage outcomes, we consider a system
of equations for estimation. In our first stage, we examine
the impact of occupational exposure on the probability of
switching occupations between periods. We create a dichot-
omous measure of our instrument. All workers who are
employed in occupations above the median level of off-
shore exposure from low-income countries are considered
‘‘tradable.’’ The results, presented in column 2, indicate that
being in a tradable occupation is associated with a 9.4 per-
centage point increase in the probability of switching occu-
pations between periods. In our second stage, we examine
the relationship between switching occupations and wage
declines when this switch is induced by trade. We find that
trade-induced occupation switches are associated with a
12.1% decline in wages between periods. This result is con-
sistent with our earlier results highlighting negative conse-
quences of globalization on wages of workers who perform
tasks that can be performed in low-income countries. In
panel B, we perform a similar analysis but use a broader
classification of occupation. If a narrower definition of
occupation implies that a worker is more likely to be per-
forming a similar task, these switches will presumably have
less important wage consequences. Consistent with this
hypothesis, the results in panel 2 indicate that trade is less
likely to induce a switch to a new two-digit occupation (6.9
percentage points), but upon switching, the negative wage
consequences are even more severe: a trade-induced occu-
pational switch across two-digit categories is associated
with a 17.2% decline in wages. These results suggest that
switching occupations is very costly to workers and pro-
vides support for our main results, suggesting that occupa-
tional exposure to competition from trade or offshoring has
more significant consequences than industry exposure.
One possibility is that workers who switch occupations in
a downward manner are less productive in unobserved
dimensions of worker quality. Weaker workers may sort into
less demanding occupations, and this may not be captured
by the human capital measures available in the CPS (e.g.,
education). While we are unable to observe variation in the
quality of workers on unobserved dimensions, we attempt to
address this possibility by adding a control to the wage equa-
tion, which is the difference between the interoccupation
wage differential for all workers in a sector and the interoc-
cupation wage differential for workers who leave that sector
in the following period. If workers who remain and those
who leave a sector are similar, then this difference should be
close to 0, and adding it as an additional control should have
no impact on our estimate. The negative impact of switching
occupations on wages is unaffected by the inclusion of the
interoccupation wage differential term (see also Trefler &
Liu, 2011, for an application to services). Our results are
suggestive that in manufacturing, worker heterogeneity does
not explain the significant decline in wages of workers who
leave their occupation due to trade or offshoring pressures.
Our results are consistent with work by Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008, 2009a, 2009b), who find large wage
declines among workers who switch occupations; this evi-
dence suggests an important role for occupation-specific
TABLE 7.— WAGE IMPACT OF SWITCHING OCCUPATIONS USING CPS WORKERS IN REPEATED SAMPLES, 1984–2002
OLS First Stage Two-Stage Least Squares
Log Wage Difference Switched Occupation Log Wage Difference
(1) (2) (3)
A: Defining an occupation switch by switching three-digit occupation
Switched Occupations between T and T þ 1 0.0054 0.121**
(0.005) (0.051)
Interoccupation Wage Differential Gap Terma 0.281 0.190
(0.223) (0.252)
Tradable Occupation (1 ¼ yes) 0.0942***
(0.022)
Number of observations 851,467 851,467 851,467
F-test of Instrument 18.91
B: Defining an occupation switch by switching one-digit occupation
Switched occupations Between T and T þ 1 0.00153 0.172***
(0.001) (0.059)
Interoccupation wage Differential gap term 0.0506 0.0594
(0.076) (0.131)
Tradable occupation (1 ¼ yes) 0.0693***
(0.020)
Number of observations 851,467 851,467 851,467
F-test of instrument 11.66
Sample is composed of CPSMORGworkers observed in two consecutive samples. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by three-digit occupation. All
models include year, state, and education level fixed effects. Other demographic controls are age, sex, nonwhite, and union status in the first period. An occupation is defined as tradable if the occupational exposure from
low-income countries (as described in table 2) is above themedian level amongmanufacturing workers in the sample. This is used to generate a binary variable for all workers in the sample and is the instrument for occupa-
tional switches. In panel A, we define an occupation switch by the worker reporting a different three-digit occupation. In panel B, an occupation switch is defined by a worker reporting a different one-digit occupation.
aThe Interoccupation Wage Differential Gap term is calculated by regressing the workers’ log wage on observable characteristics and a set of occupation dummies among all workers and among workers who
switch occupations between periods. The difference in means of these terms is included in our regressions to control for potential selection on unobservables of those who switch occupations. Significant at *10%,
**5%, ***1%.
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human capital in a worker’s wage profile. Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008, 2009a, 2009b) also argue that occupation
switching may be an important cause of the increase in U.S.
wage inequality, as younger workers are missing out on the
benefits to occupational tenure enjoyed by workers in pre-
vious decades. Insofar as this is partly driven by competi-
tion from overseas, this highlights another mechanism by
which offshoring may be responsible for declining U.S.
wages and increasing wage inequality.
IV. Conclusion
This paper reexamines the impact of trade and offshor-
ing, two primary measures of globalization, on U.S. work-
ers. Using CPS data, which we merge with data on exports,
imports, and BEA data on offshoring, we make three main
contributions. First, we draw a distinction between the
impact of globalization on industrial wage differentials and
on occupation wage differentials. Globalization has had
small or insignificant effects on industry wage differentials
but significant effects on occupation wage differentials.
These results are consistent with recent empirical work
demonstrating the importance of occupational tenure and
downplaying the importance of tenure within a particular
industry in determining a worker’s wage.
Second, we extend previous analyses that focused exclu-
sively on manufacturing sector workers to explore the
impact of trade and offshoring on all workers. Third, we
use a two-stage approach to show that one important avenue
through which globalization affects wages is by pushing
workers out of the manufacturing sector to take lower-pay-
ing jobs elsewhere. Using a CPS panel of workers and the
exposure of an occupation to trade as an instrument for
whether a worker switched occupations, we find that occu-
pation switching due to trade led to real wage losses of 12
to 17 percentage points between 1983 and 2002. The results
are robust to the inclusion of a term from Trefler and Lui
(2011) that captures the possibility that the least able work-
ers are most likely to switch into lower-paying occupations.
Our results provide new evidence that the negative conse-
quences of trade on workers are mediated through a realloca-
tion of labor across sectors and into different occupations.
While older models of trade posited that workers could move
in a costless manner to new jobs in the face of pressure from
foreign labor, we identify large and significant wage declines
among workers who leave manufacturing; the wage decline
is particularly pronounced for those who switch occupations.
These results are consistent with new trade models that intro-
duce frictions into the labor reallocation process, such as
Cosar (2010) and Artuc et al. (2010). Our evidence is consis-
tent with greater frictions in moving across occupations
rather than across industries.
We also explored how the impact of globalization on
wages has changed over time. Our different measures of glo-
balization have no significant impact on wages during the
first half of our sample. While our sample extends from 1984
to 2002, both offshoring and trade exert significant effects on
wages only in the second half of this period. The effects of
these globalization measures are confined to individuals who
work in routine occupations, indicating that much of the
brunt of globalization is borne by individuals who perform
tasks that are easily copied by workers elsewhere.
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